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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

: •

NEIL STEVEN PIXTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20030146-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
Appellant/Defendant Neil Steven Pixton ("Appellant" or "Mr. Pixton") was
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) on May 15, 2001. Although Mr. Pixton
had only one conviction for DUI when arrested, he subsequently pled guilty to a second
DUI related charge. The state thereafter charged Mr. Pixton with a third degree felony
because two prior convictions were in place before the DUI charge at issue in this case
was resolved.
The parties below and before this Court focused on the 2002 version of the statute
in arguing as to whether the enhancement was properly charged. The judge's findings,
conclusions and order reference the 2001 version of the statute, without reiterating the
language of the statute.
Oral argument was held in this Court on February 25, 2004 before Judges Thorne,
Orme and Jackson. During oral argument, the parties discussed the application of the
earlier version of the enhancement statute to this case, and requested the opportunity to

file supplemental briefs. This Court issued an order on March 1, 2004 requesting
supplemental briefing on this issue. See. order in Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The offense in this case was improperly enhanced to a felony regardless of
whether the 2002 or the 2001 version of the statute is applied. As set forth in appellant's
brief, the enhancement is improper under the 2002 version. The same analysis applies to
the 2001 version. Moreover, the plain language of the 2001 version makes it clear that
two prior convictions must be in place at the time the violation is committed. Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-3 and the state and federal ex post facto provisions require that the 2001
version be applied. This issue was preserved for review where Mr. Pixton presented the
issue and support to the court. Moreover, since the trial court based its decision on the
2001 version, the issue is properly before this Court. Alternatively, the issue can be
reviewed for plain error.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE DUI WAS IMPROPERLY ENHANCED TO A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY SINCE ONLY ONE PRIOR CONVICTION
EXISTED AT THE TIME THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED.
Mr. Pixton had one prior DUI conviction within the past ten years when the crime
in this case was committed. He also had a DUI charge pending. The state dismissed the
class B misdemeanor DUI charge which was initially filed in this case and refiled the
case as a third degree felony after Mr. Pixton pled guilty to alcohol related reckless
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driving on the pending DUI charge. The issue before this Court is whether the charge in
this case was properly enhanced to a felony even though Mr. Pixton did not have two
prior convictions when the offense was committed.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 allows a DUI to be enhanced to a felony when a
defendant has two prior convictions for a DUI related offense within the past ten years.
The version of the statute referenced by the parties below and in the briefs filed in this
Court states in pertinent part:
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree
felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten
years of two or more prior convictions.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 2002). This version of the statute went into
effect May 6, 2002.
The 2001 version of the statute, effective April 30, 2001, contained different
language. That version, which was in effect when the offense in this case was
committed, states:
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree
felony if it is committed:
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this
section.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001); s_ee_ Addendum B containing 2001 and 2002
versions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). According to the legislative history from
the 2002 general session, the 2001 version of the statute ,!require[d] that a person needs
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to be convicted of the first two DUI's before he committed the third one in order for that
third one to count as a felony." Floor Debate, Rep. A. Lamont Tyler, Utah Leg., 2002
Gen. Sess., January 25, 2002 ("legislative history"); see legislative history in
Addendum C.
A. THE 2001 VERSION OF THE STATUTE, WHICH WAS IN EFFECT
WHEN THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED, APPLIES TO THIS CASE.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) and the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution require that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the crime
controls. Whether retroactive application of a statute violates section 68-3-3 or the
ex post facto clause is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Daniels, 2002 UT 2,137, 40 P.3d 611.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 states, "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." This statute embodies "the long-standing rule of statutory
construction" that courts "do not apply retroactively legislative enactments that alter
substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has clearly expressed that
intention." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co.. 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (citations
omitted). While an exception to the general rule against retroactivity exists when the
change in the law is procedural, that exception is narrowly drawn and applies only to
circumstances that have "nothing to do with the substance of defendant's crime or the
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amount of punishment specified for it." Daniels. 2002 UT 2, f40; see also Mclntyre Inv.
Co..956P.2dat261.
i
4

i
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Utah courts "have interpreted the Utah ex post facto clause, Utah Const. Art. I,
§ 18 consistently with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the ex post
facto clause found in the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1."
Daniels. 2002 UT 2,1J42 (footnotes omitted). "[A]n ex post facto law is one that
punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; one
that makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time
when the act was committed.'" Id,, ^43, citing State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah
1983) (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (further citation omitted)),
overruled on other grounds. State v. Hansen, 634 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). A law violates
the ex post facto clause if it is applied retrospectively, i.e. to events that occurred before it
was enacted and '" disadvantage^] the offender affected by it' . . . by altering the
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime

" Lvnce v.

Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (further citations omitted); see also Miller v. Florida. 482
U.S. 423,435 (1987) (revised sentencing guidelines that recommend a longer
presumptive sentencing range than the guidelines in effect at the time of the crime violate
the ex post facto clause).
To the extent the law in effect at the time of the crime disallowed enhancement
under the circumstances of this case whereas the current statute allowed enhancement
regardless of when the prior convictions were entered, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 and the
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ex post facto protection of the Utah and United States Constitutions require that the
statute in effect at the time of the offense control this Court's decision. This is so
because a change in the law that affects the amount of punishment or changes the nature
of the crime by enhancing it from a misdemeanor to a felony is substantive in nature and
protected by the statute and constitutions. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3; Daniels, 2002
UT2,t*0.
B. THE DUI IN THIS CASE COULD NOT BE ENHANCED TO A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY UNDER THE VERSION OP- THE
STATUTE IN EFFECT ON THE DATE ON WHICH THE OFFENSE
OCCURRED BECAUSE THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE NOT IN
PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE.
Mr. Pixton argued in the trial court and before this Court that the DUI cannot be
enhanced to a third degree felony because the prior convictions were not in place when
the offense in this case occurred. As Mr. Pixton outlined in his opening brief, Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(l) (2002) required that convictions be in place at the time of the
offense. Such an interpretation is consistent with due process and State v. Lopes . 1999
UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, and is consistent with a majority of jurisdictions that require that
any convictions used to enhance a charge be in place at the time of the incident. See
Appt. brf. at 7-14 and citations therein.
The version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense likewise requires that
the prior convictions be in place at the time of the crime in order to enhance the offense
to a third degree felony. The 2001 version stated, "[a] conviction for violation of
i
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Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is committed: (i) within ten years of two or
more prior convictions under this section." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001).
Pursuant to the plain language of the 2001 version, the DUI offense must be
"committed: within ten years of two or more prior convictions." See. generally
Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221, ^12, 51 P.3d 1288 (in
interpreting a statute, courts rely on the plain language unless it is ambiguous). The
language distinguishes between a conviction and a violation and states that a conviction
for "violation" of the DUI statute is a felony if "it" is committed within ten years of two
or more prior convictions. The word "it" refers to the word "violation" and plainly
requires that the violation be within ten years of two prior convictions. Additionally, the
statute's reference to the time at which the crime is committed is significant, as
recognized by the state. See state's brief at 19; see Arredondo v. Avis Rent a Car Svs..
Inc.. 2001 UT 29, ^12, 24 P.3d 928 (further citations omitted) (courts "'presume that the
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning'"). The 2001 statute's language requires two or more
prior convictions at the time at which the violation "is committed" in order to enhance.
In addition, the offense must be committed within ten years of "prior" convictions. At
the time the offense in this case was committed, it was committed within ten years of
only one prior conviction. The plain language of the statute, with each word being given
effect, mandates that the prior convictions be in place at the time of commission.
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The legislative history recognizes that the 2001 version required that the prior
convictions be in place when the offense was committed in order to elevate the offense to
a felony. See Addendum C. As Representative Tyler stated at the 2002 general
legislative session, M[t]he law requires that a person needs to be convicted of the first two
DUI's before he committed the third one in order for the third one to count as a felony."
Legislative history in Addendum C.
In addition, the language of the 2001 version is distinct from the language in the
statute at issue in State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995), where the Court held that an
enhanced charge for "a second or subsequent conviction" for distribution of drug
offenses could be charged in a single information along with the initial charge. The "is
committed" and "prior conviction" language in the 2001 version of the statute at issue in
this case is not found in the statute at issue in Hunt, which instead simply provides for
enhancement "upon a second or subsequent conviction." Because the 2001 version of
section 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) ties the prior convictions into the time at which the offense is
committed, the decision in Hunt provides no guidance in this case. See discussion of
Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, in Appt.'s brf. at 9-10.
Moreover, as outlined in Appellant's brief at 10-11, the decision in State v. Lopes ,
1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, undermines Hunt because pursuant to Lopes, the existence
of two or more prior convictions is an element of the enhanced DUI crime. The state
cannot prove the element that Mr. Pixton had two or more DUI related convictions when
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he committed the offense in this case. Lopes requires that an enhancement based on
prior convictions is an element of the crime of enhanced DUI and suggests that the
convictions must therefore be in place when the crime is committed.
As set forth in Appellant's brief at 11, many jurisdictions require that the prior
conviction be in place when the offense is committed in order to use the prior conviction
for enhancement. See Appt. brf. at 11 and cases cited therein. The rationale for
requiring that the prior convictions be in place when the crime was committed is based
on the fact that without such a requirement, a necessary element does not exist at the time
of commission as well as the notion that enhanced penalties are directed at people who
persist in criminal activity after being punished and having the opportunity to reform.
If this statute were interpreted to allow enhancement even though two prior
convictions were not in place at the time of the offense, the focus of the enhanced charge
would be on the timing of the entry of the convictions rather than on the time at which
the defendant committed the crime. The 2001 version of the statute makes it plain,
however, that the time at which the offense is committed controls the determination of
whether the offense qualifies for enhancement.
If the 2001 version were interpreted to allow enhancement even though the prior
convictions were not in place when the offense was committed, the statute would fail to
give adequate notice as to the circumstances under which the statute applies, in violation
of due process. See State v. Smith. 48 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ("Due
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process requires the state to provide fair notice to its citizens of prohibited conduct and
potential consequences flowing from such conduct"); Gravned v. City of Rockland . 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (a statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process if
it fails to provide a "person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited . . ."). Because the 2001 version focuses on the time of commission
and states that "[a] conviction for a violation . . . is a third degree felony if it [the
violation] is committed: [ ] within ten years of two or more prior convictions .. .", a
person of ordinary intelligence would not know that s/he would be subject to the
enhanced offense if s/he committed a DUI offense when s/he had only one DUI related
offense. Interpreting the 2001 statute to allow enhancement would violate due process
since the statute does not give notice that the enhancement applies in these
circumstances. In order to interpret the statute to meet constitutional requirements, the
language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001) must be followed and the statute
must be interpreted to require entry of convictions prior to the commission of the offense.
C. THIS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW;
ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT CAN REACH THE ISSUE UNDER
THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE.
To preserve an argument for appeal, a party must raise the issue in the trial court
and adequately identify the grounds for the argument. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). An issue is preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the
court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue."5" Hart v. Salt Lake County
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Comm'n., 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (further citations omitted); s.ee_ also
State v.Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, ^[33, 64 P.3d 1218 (further citation omitted) (objection
adequate where the trial court is "'given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if
appropriate, correct it'"). "c [F]or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it
must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider
it.'" LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises. 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(quoting James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah 1987)). The purpose of the
preservation rule is to fUput[ ] the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[ ] the
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.'" Brown, 856
P.2d at 359 (further citation omitted). In this case, Mr. Pixton preserved his claim that
the enhancement should not be imposed by bringing the issue to the trial court's
attention, specifying the grounds for his claim that the enhancement was improper and
obtaining a ruling from the trial court.
Mr. Pixton brought the argument that the enhancement was improper to the
judge's attention by filing a "Motion to Reduce Charge" and accompanying
memorandum. R. 62-63. In those papers, Mr. Pixton argued that "the plain language of
the statute requires that Mr. Pixton be charged with a class B misdemeanor because
Mr. Pixton did not have two prior convictions within ten years of the charge at issue" and
that charging Mr. Pixton with a felony violated due process because the statute required
that two convictions be in place at the time of the violation and did not give notice that a
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DUI could be enhanced if the conviction occurred after the violation. R. 62, 64-70.
Although Mr. Pixton's memorandum quoted the language of the 2002 version, his papers
as a whole made it clear that he was challenging the felony charge because the language
of the statute precluded the enhancement.
In response, the state argued that the statute allowed for the imposition of the
enhancement. The state also quoted the 2002 version of the statute, arguing that the
plain language of the statute along with the Supreme Court decision in Hunt precluded
imposition of the enhancement. R. 45-49.
At the argument on the motion hearing, the trial judge stated, "the issue is whether
or not the enhancement statute should apply to the date of the conviction or the date of
the offenses . . . and that's legal argument." R. 112:3. Mr. Pixton argued that the prior
convictions must be in place when the offense is committed, that Hunt did not control
decision because the language of that statute at issue in that case was different, and that
the decision in Lopes undermined Hunt and demonstrated that the element of prior
convictions must be in place at the time of the offense. R. 112.
The trial court was aware not only that Mr. Pixton challenged the enhancement
because he did not have two prior convictions when he committed the offense, but also
that the state charged the offense claiming that Mr. Pixton had two prior convictions at
the time of the violation. The Information in this case states that "defendant has at least
two or more prior convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 within ten years of this
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violation." R. 4, 7. The charged offense, according to the Information, was a third
degree felony based on the existence of two or more prior convictions within ten years of
the "violation," in other words, within ten years of the commission of the offense. The
trial court record reflects that the phrase "[o]f this violation" in the Information was
circled, presumably by the trial judge. R. 7. This shows that the judge was aware of this
language and aware that the charging document focused on date of violation.
Nevertheless, the judge ruled against Mr. Pixton, concluding that the enhancement
statute requires two convictions at the time of trial or plea rather than two prior
convictions at the time of violation.
Moreover, the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order Denying Defense
Motion to Reduce Charge" explicitly rely on the 2001 version of the statute. In other
words, the ruling is based on the 2001 version even though the parties quoted the 2002
version in their papers. This reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001)
further demonstrates that this issue was properly preserved for review. Indeed, the
record as a whole demonstrates that this issue was adequately presented to the judge,
along with the grounds, and that the judge had the opportunity to address it. See
generally Hart, 776 P.2d at 655 (an issue is preserved if it is presented to the trial court
and the court rules on it).
Alternatively, even if this issue had not been raised at all below, this Court could
review it for plain error. Plain error occurs when "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should
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have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. . . ."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); State v. Eldredge . 773 P.2d 29, 35
(Utah 1989). In this case, the error in allowing the enhancement under the 2001 version
was obvious in light of the language of the statute. As set forth supra at 6-10, the statute
made it plain that for the enhancement to apply, the two prior convictions must be in
place prior to committing the violation. Indeed, the plain language of the 2001 version
states, "[a] conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is
committed: (i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). Moreover, it is obvious under section 68-3-3 and
Utah ex post facto case law that the 2001 version of the statute applies. See_ discussion
supra at 4-6. In the event this Court believes the 2002 version allows the enhancement
whereas the 2001 version does not, Mr. Pixton is prejudiced by the error since under the
2001 version, his conviction would be for a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Should
this Court conclude that the 2002 version allows the enhancement, there is therefore a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome if the 2001 version is applied.
Analyzing the issue under the correct statute even if the parties below focused on
an incorrect version of the statute is consistent with fairness and judicial economy. See
Moosavi v. Maryland. 736 A.2d 285, 290-91 (Md. 1999) (recognizing that "fairness and
judicial economy justify granting relief on direct appeal" even if claim that statute is
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inapplicable was not raised); In re Matter of Arbitration Between Kennedy et. al. v.
Young, 524 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying correct statute on appeal
even though judge relied on incorrect statute below); Comer v. Kansas , 942 P.2d 658,
660 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (reaching issue under correct statute even though trial court
relied on wrong statute below); State v. Johnson, 35 P.3d 1024,1027 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)
(same); see also State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 937 (Utah 1996) (plain error occurred
where trial court failed to make findings as required by statute even though defense
counsel did not request findings).
Additionally, an appellate court can review and vacate a conviction where the
charge is improper under the elements statute because the trial court lacked statutory
authority to convict and sentence the defendant under the charge. See State v. Trujillo,
747 P.2d 262, 263 (N.M. 1987) (determining that "because the charge of violation of [the
statute] was improper, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence
defendant"). In Trujillo, the parties and trial court incorrectly believed that the defendant
could be charged with escape under the New Mexico escape statute. Id. at 263. The
issue therefore was not raised below. IdL_ The Court of Appeals held that the escape
statute did not include the defendant's actions, and vacated the conviction and sentence
because "the trial court proceeded without jurisdiction." Id. at 265.
In this case where Mr. Pixton made his argument against enhancement clear to the
trial court, the trial court apparently recognized that the state charged the enhancement
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based on two prior convictions in existence when the violation occurred and the judge
based her ruling on the 2001 version of the statute, the issue was properly preserved for
review. Additionally, because the 2001 version of the DUI enhancement statute did not
authorize a felony in this case, the enhancement can be vacated because the trial court
lacked authority to impose the conviction and sentence. Moreover, this Court can review
the issue because the error was obvious and prejudiced the defendant.
D. THE ENHANCED THIRD DEGREE FELONY SHOULD BE
VACATED UNDER EITHER VERSION OF THE DUI
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE.
Mr. Pixton continues to maintain that the enhancement was improperly applied in
this case because he did not have two prior convictions for DUI related offenses at the
time the violation was committed. Under either the 2002 or 2001 version of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i), the DUI charge in this case was improperly elevated to a felony
when Mr. Pixton pled guilty to an alcohol related reckless driving charge after the
offense in this case occurred.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Neil Steven Pixton respectfully requests that the
enhancement be stricken.
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SUBMITTED this Ji~»> day of March, 2004.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

HAR0120M
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER FOR
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING
Case No. 20.030146-CA

Neil Steven Pixton,
Defendant and Appellant

Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.
Although the court preliminarily indicated at oral argument
that supplemental briefing would be unnecessary, upon further
reflection the court believes supplemental briefing is
appropriate.
Accordingly, we request both parties to submit supplemental
briefs on the statutory issue discussed during oral argument,
according to the following schedule. Defendant is granted
twenty-one days from this date to file his brief. The State has
fifteen days, from the date Defendant's brief is submitted to
this court, to file its response.
DATED this

of March, 2004

ADDENDUM B
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002) states:
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree
felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten
years of two or more prior convictions.

Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001) states:
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree
felony if it is committed:
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this
section.

ADDENDUM C
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HOUSE BELL 17
2002 GENERAL LEGISLATIVE SESSION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DAY #5, JAN 25,2002
CLERK: House Bill 17: Multiple driving under the influence offences. L. Lamont Tyler.
SPEAKER: Representative Tyler
REP. TYLER: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I request that Mr. Paul Boyden of the State Board
Association of Prosecutors of (inaudible) come to my desk to answer questions on this bill.
SPEAKER: That would be fine Representative Tyler
REP TYLER: Thank you. Representatives, House Bill 17 deals with a serious problem. The
law requires that a person needs to be convicted of thefirsttwo DUTs before he committed the
third one in order for that third one to count as a felony. I think this is not the intent of the
Legislature (inaudible) it should be not the intent of our society. What this Bill does is correct
that and provides a third conviction count as a felony without regard to when the offenses were
committed. It also provides that, or clarifies rather, the fact that driving with a (inaudible)
illegally controlled substance of the body (inaudible) count as a DUI and prior conviction which
is reduced later by the court is also counted as a previous conviction. This bill is supported by
the Prosecutors Association, The Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, (inaudible)
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance Abuse
(inaudible). I'd be happy to answer your questions.
SPEAKER: Further discussion to House Bill 17. No further (inaudible). Rep. Tyler, back to
you for summation.
REP. TYLER: We appreciate your support on this bill. Thank you.
SPEAKER: The voting is open on House Bill 17. Seeing all present having voted, Rep. Divory.
Voting will be closed. House Bill 17, having received 70 yes votes and zero no votes passes this
body and will be referred to the Senate for further consideration, madam.

